



# In the **Line** of **Fire**

**Surveying the Perceptions of Humanitarian and Development Personnel of the Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

**Ryan Beasley, Cate Buchanan and Robert Muggah**

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## Design and production

Richard Jones

Exile: Design and Editorial Services  
rmjones@onetel.net.uk

## About the organisations

**The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue** is an independent and impartial organisation, based in Geneva, Switzerland, dedicated to dialogue on humanitarian issues, the resolution of violent conflict and the alleviation of its impacts on people. The Centre facilitates high-level, low-key dialogue amongst principal actors to armed conflict as well as other stakeholders such as NGOs and UN agencies.

This work is complemented by research and policy efforts to advance action on contemporary humanitarian challenges such as the nature of non-state armed groups, mediation techniques, war economies, the rule of law and arms availability. In 2001 the Centre established the Human Security and Small Arms Programme which undertakes a variety of projects aimed at furthering understanding about the human cost of weapons availability and misuse, as well as advocating options for action.

Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

114 rue de Lausanne, Geneva, 1202, Switzerland

Phone: + 41.22.908.1130 Fax: + 41.22.908.1140

E-mail: [info@hdcentre.org](mailto:info@hdcentre.org) Web: [www.hdcentre.org](http://www.hdcentre.org)

**The Small Arms Survey** is an independent research project located at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Established in 1999, the project is supported by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and by contributions from the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It collaborates with the United Nations, international organisations, and with various research institutes and non-governmental organisations in many countries including Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Georgia, Germany, Israel, Kenya, Norway, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Small Arms Survey

Ground Floor, 47 Avenue Blanc, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

Phone: +41.22.908.57.77 Fax: +41.22.732.27.38

E-mail: [smallarm@hei.unige.ch](mailto:smallarm@hei.unige.ch) Web: [www.smallarmssurvey.org](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org)



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Humanitarian  
Dialogue



*Dedicated to the drivers, nurses, development officers, doctors,  
and countless others working for development and humanitarian  
organisations who are threatened, intimidated, injured and  
killed in the course of their work.*

*And to the civilians who suffer the most from the availability  
and misuse of small arms.*

**relief**

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## Executive summary

Any debate concerning the impacts of small arms availability and misuse in societies severely affected by armed violence is a discussion of the obvious. From the newly recruited water and sanitation specialist to the seasoned food security programme officer—there is a common refrain: small arms are ubiquitous and affect the quality and quantity of our work. Indeed, small arms are everywhere—and their unregulated availability and misuse constitute a menace to humanitarian access and protection, as well as a formidable obstacle to human development.

The use and abuse of small arms kill twenty times more people than landmines and unexploded ordinances: at least 500,000 men, women and children each year. But while attention to the landmines crisis is warranted and urgent, awareness, much less preventive action, of the issue of small arms is woefully inadequate. This study was developed in order to contribute to changing this situation.

The findings of this study represent the first phase of a multi-year and multi-agency initiative to appraise the impacts of small arms availability and misuse on a particular segment of the civilian community who are in the line of fire. Developing an evidence base of the impacts of small arms on the personnel and activities of humanitarian and development agencies, and the people they seek to protect and assist, is a first, but nevertheless important, step to reducing their daily exposure to insecurity.

The sheer pervasiveness of small arms has led to a perverse situation: they are such a common feature of the landscape that they are often ignored or treated as an unavoidable (albeit unfortunate) aspect of humanitarian and development work. While an array of UN Secretary-General reports and a rash of anecdotal studies have highlighted the dangers of armed violence to humanitarian and development personnel there remains a deficiency of evidence-based analysis to prove what is already intuitively known: *that aid workers are frequently targeted and exposed to a high risk of death and injury in the course of their work.*

The Security and Risk in Humanitarian and Development Action Study (study, hereafter), involved a survey distributed in seven languages, in 39 countries and two territories, and the participation of 10 humanitarian and development agencies. Though only a preliminary snapshot, by drawing on a representative distribution of countries and agencies, and employing robust survey instruments and statistical analysis, the study fills an important knowledge gap. It captures the perceptions of and attitudes toward small arms availability and misuse of over 600 respondents working in a variety of security environments—and privileges the views of those working at the local level.

Though not a new revelation, the study confirms that civilians are frequently the victims of small arms use and abuse, and that most staff feel personally threatened by small arms on a regular basis. According to these workers, humanitarian and development interventions are also adversely affected by the prevalence and misuse of small arms. The study also finds that irrespective of the security context, responding personnel overwhelmingly report a large number of groups to be in possession of weapons.



Camp for displaced  
Madurese, Borneo,  
Central Kalimantan,  
Sampit.  
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What should raise a number of red flags for the humanitarian and development communities is the fact that the vast majority of respondents indicated that they have not received any security training within the organisation for which they currently work. Moreover there is an alarming discrepancy between security training provided to national and expatriate staff: nationals are only half as likely to have received security training as expatriates. The importance of training cannot be overstated, particularly as the study reveals that those who have received security training consider it to be helpful in dealing with their exposure to small arms availability and misuse.

No two situations are alike as the study's focus on the Balkans and Southeast Asia revealed. Though respondents from both regions frequently reported observing handguns, respondents in Southeast Asia were much more likely than respondents in the Balkans to report having seen assault rifles. Nor surprising, then, that respondents from Southeast Asia more frequently reported operational hindrances than did respondents from the Balkans.

The operational and policy implications of this study are multifaceted. In addition to encouraging a debate within and between the humanitarian and development communities about ways to confront the unregulated availability and misuse of small arms, an array of pragmatic interventions could usefully contribute to improving the security of staff and civilians. For example, though incidence reporting is already being carried out by most agencies, improving its coverage as well as capacities for the analysis of data should be encouraged. Moreover, internal security reviews designed to assess the perceptions of staff as they relate to all weapons availability should be further considered. Many agencies would also benefit from the inclusion of small arms availability and misuse as early-warning indicators or as factors in conflict mapping exercises. Finally, more attention to the issue of small arms could be paid in relation to risk assessments, training and debriefing. Lobbying and advocacy strategies based on the human cost of this weapons availability also represent another entry point.

# The Security and Risk in Humanitarian Action and Development Study

## Small arms availability: A human security crisis

The misuse of small arms and light weapons contributes to the violation of human rights, undermines sustainable development, exacerbates interpersonal violence and impedes humanitarian operations. An estimated 1,300 people die per day, and an unknown amount of people suffer a range of debilitating and permanent injuries at the barrel of a gun.<sup>1</sup> Almost 640 million weapons are thought to be in circulation, used by a combination of state forces (e.g. police, militaries, customs and border agents), non-state armed groups (e.g. insurgent forces, organised criminal gangs, private security forces) and civilians (e.g. for sporting and recreation, defensive, and offensive purposes).<sup>2</sup>

It is only recently that the issue has attracted the attention of the international community, as evidenced by the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001 (2001 UN Conference) which led to the adoption of a global Programme of Action.<sup>3</sup> In parallel, various national and regional initiatives have been launched that focus primarily on controlling the illicit supply of these weapons. However, few of these worthwhile efforts focus explicitly on reducing the human costs of availability and misuse.

In this regard the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (the Centre) and the Small Arms Survey (SAS) are committed to exploring the human dimension of small arms availability and misuse. In this joint project, informed by the voices of those people directly affected by small arms in the course of their daily lives, we hope to highlight two issues:

- *The human cost of weapons use* and abuse on a particular civilian community, many members of which are responsible for the provision of protection and assistance to larger and vulnerable civilian communities all over the world;
- *Practical and policy-relevant recommendations* for NGOs, UN agencies, and governments, as well as an advocacy tool to ensure greater attention and action to the crisis of small arms use and abuse.

## Research to date

A number of studies have been undertaken to examine the prevalence of small arms and the extent to which they impact upon humanitarian and development activities. Two studies carried out by the SAS (*Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian*

1. The Small Arms Survey estimates that 500,000 people a year die from small arms use. Up to 300,000 in war zones, and 200,000 due to homicide, suicide and accidents. Small Arms Survey (2001), *The Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

2. Civilian weapons actually constitute some 59% of the global small arms stockpile. Small Arms Survey (2002), *The Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

3. See United Nations General Assembly (2001), *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, New York, 9–20 July, A/CONF.192/15.

**“GAZA CITY, December 3, 2002**—International UN staff today took the unprecedented measure of calling on Israel to hold its military to account and protect all UN and other aid workers operating in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) from harm, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law. The demand is an independent initiative taken by over 60 international staff from 22 countries.

The call for justice follows the death of a UN worker, Iain Hook, a 53-year-old British citizen, who was shot in the back by an Israeli sniper on November 22, 2002 while negotiating an evacuation of Palestinian civilians and UN staff from a UN compound in Jenin refugee camp. Following the fatal shooting, the Israeli military further refused to permit the access of an ambulance to assist Mr Hook.”<sup>4</sup>

*Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 2001 and *Perceptions of Small Arms Availability and Use Among Oxfam GB Field Personnel*, 2001) have increased our understanding of the opportunity costs of weapons availability on human security.<sup>5</sup> A report prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also highlights the serious consequences for civilians of unregulated weapons proliferation during and after wars.<sup>6</sup>

The ICRC and SAS studies are important antecedents for this project, shaping the focus of inquiry and highlighting important issues in need of further clarification.<sup>7</sup> Employing distinct methodologies and drawing on different samples of respondents, both studies highlight the implications of widespread civilian possession of small arms, the frequent interruption of operations and inaccessibility of beneficiary populations due to weapons availability, and the pervasiveness of intentional violence directed at civilians and workers alike. Building on this valuable work, this study aims to further clarify the scale and magnitude of the impacts of small arms availability by extending evidence collection to multiple agencies and operational contexts and by increasing response rates and representation.

## The study

Against this backdrop, the Centre and the SAS collaborated to implement a multi-year study that would:

- *Collect information* on the intentional non-fatal and fatal injuries, morbidity and mortality experienced by humanitarian and development workers in the course of their work;

4. E-mail alert from the Federation of International Civil Servants Associations, December 4, 2002.

5. Muggah, Robert (2001), *Perceptions of Small Arms Availability among Oxfam GB Field Personnel*, Oxfam GB/Small Arms Survey, Geneva; and Muggah, Robert and Eric Berman (2001), *Humanitarianism under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Study Commissioned by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Small Arms Survey, Geneva. See also Muggah, Robert with Martin Griffiths (2002), *Reconsidering the Tools of War: Small Arms and Humanitarian Action*, HPN Network Paper 39, ODI, London; and Muggah, Robert and Peter Batchelor (2002), *Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development. A Study of the Socio-Economic Impacts and Development Linkages of Small Arms Proliferation, Availability and Use*, Emergency Response Division, UNDP, New York.

6. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1999), *Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, ICRC, Geneva.

7. Other studies have established longitudinal trends in mortality and morbidity among humanitarian workers and peace-keeping personnel. These studies draw on existing agency-level reporting systems and lack denominator data. See Seet, Benjamin and Gilbert Burnham (2000), “Fatality Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 1948–1998,” *Journal of the American Medical Association*, Vol. 284, No. 5, August, pp. 598–603 and Sheik, Mani, Maria Isabel Gutierrez, Paul Bolton, Paul Spiegel, Michel Thieren, and Gilbert Burnham (2000), “Deaths Among Humanitarian Workers,” *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 321, pp. 166–169.

### Box 1: A snapshot of the survey

**Who:** The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Small Arms Survey

**With:** CARE, Oxfam GB, Médecins du Monde, Concern Worldwide, World Vision, UNDP, Handicap International, Merlin, Save the Children Federation and local partner NGOs

**What:** 602 questionnaires from 10 organisations (including local partner organisations), in 39 countries and two territories


**Where:** Global survey with two focus regions with a particular focus on Cambodia, Thailand, and the Philippines in Southeast Asia. In the Balkans, particular focus on Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo

**When:** Questionnaires were distributed between April and June 2002, and collected between August and November 2002

**How:** Available in electronic and paper version, and in Spanish, French, English, Serbian, Albanian, Khmer and Portuguese

- *Estimate the pervasiveness of small arms* availability in programme areas and ask personnel about the types of risk-avoidance strategies—whether security protocol, security training or personal means—they find useful;
- *Provide some assessments of the threats* posed to the safety and well-being of agency personnel and civilian populations as a result of the widespread availability and misuse of small arms;
- *Facilitate greater understanding* of these particular human costs amongst the disarmament, humanitarian, development and governmental communities; and
- *Introduce and strengthen an evidence-based approach* that could be applied to informing advocacy and policy decisions in relation to the security of civilians and personnel.

The study privileges the perceptions and experiences of a particular community of workers and insists that those at the frontline of humanitarian and development activity



"More afraid of being old than of dying", Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.  
© KEYSTONE/AP Photo/  
Boris Heger

have a contribution to make to the diplomatic, policy and research processes underway in relation to the control of small arms. Hence considerable time, energy and resources were devoted to translating the questionnaire into seven languages, visiting national and local offices of organisations, rallying support within headquarters, and finding solutions to logistical hurdles that might have impeded the participation of potential respondents.

### The study's value to the relief and development community

The mandates of relief and development organisations vary significantly: from evangelism to solidarity missions, emergency work to service provision and from long-term economic activities to short-term humanitarian interventions. What became clear through the course of this project, as a result of speaking with people in various locations who were undertaking a rich variety of activities, is that weapons availability compromised the quality and quantity of their work in multiple ways. An earlier study investigating the deaths of 375 UN and NGO aid workers and UN peacekeepers over a 14-year period from 1985 to 1998 came to similar conclusions: “Humans with weapons rather than motor vehicles pose the greatest threat. Not only do young inexperienced workers die but veterans as well. Many deaths occur early in an assignment, before risks may be fully appreciated. Robbery seems to be a common motive. Both expatriates and national staff share the risks, with death among the latter group probably greatly under-reported.”<sup>8</sup>

Evacuations, temporary suspension of operations, and intentional violence directed at personnel reduce the ability of organisations to fulfil their mandates. The study demonstrates that the generation of good and reliable measures of risk and insecurity generated by small arms use and misuse can yield a range of direct and indirect benefits to a wide variety of organisations.

This study aims to complement efforts by organisations to understand the nature of the security environments in which they work, particularly in relation to the prevalence, location, types, and use of small arms. The issue of staff security is contentious and where security measures have been adopted, it tends to vary across organisations in terms of its quality, capacity and approach. In this regard, this study should be viewed as an effort to shed light on a particularly lethal dimension of the overall challenge associated with security provision.

8. Sheik, Mani et al. (2000).

# Summary of findings

*Over 600 responses were received from 10 organisations working in 39 countries and two territories. A wide variety of regions are represented in the sample, with approximately one third of responses coming from the Balkans and one third from Southeast Asia—the study’s two focus regions. Other regions with substantial numbers of respondents include South Asia (10%), Central Africa (6%), and Central America (5%).*

*Respondents reported working in a variety of security environments: from “little” or “no” violence to “widespread armed conflict”. A strong factor related to individuals’ assessments of their security environment is the estimated level of small arms availability and misuse.*

*Regardless of the security context, humanitarian and development workers reported a large number of groups to be in possession of weapons. Beyond the military, police, and private security forces, a majority of respondents reported many other groups to be armed, including organised criminal groups, insurgent groups, and civilians. A sizable percentage of respondents estimate “moderate” to “very high” levels of civilian possession of small arms.*

*Operations are adversely affected by the availability and use of small arms. Frequent obstacles—such as evacuations, suspensions or delays, and inaccessible beneficiaries—are associated with violent security environments and with higher estimates of small arms prevalence and misuse. Nearly *three quarters* of personnel working in areas with “very high” levels of small arms availability reported recent suspensions or delays in operations.*

*Civilians are frequently the victims of small arms use. Targeting of civilians, unintentional death and injury, and frequent use of small arms for criminal or coercive purposes were all noted. Overall, the highest proportion of weapons-related death and injury among civilians were attributed to handguns. In areas characterised by widespread conflict or war, assault rifles surpassed handguns as the leading cause of weapons-related death and injury among civilians. Respondents also appear to routinely encounter a variety of small arms—mostly handguns and assault rifles—in and around “programme” areas.*

*Many staff feel personally threatened by small arms. Perceptions of personal threat are heightened not only in areas characterised by higher levels of violence or conflict, but also in areas where civilian possession of small arms is seen to be more prevalent. In addition to perceptions of personal threat, a large number of respondents report that they or their colleagues have experienced serious security incidents, including armed intimidation, armed robbery, armed assault, detention and kidnapping. Many respondents report colleagues having suffered either non-fatal or fatal small arms-related injuries.*

*Despite working in dangerous environments, many personnel indicated that they have not received any security training within the organisation for which they currently work. The frequency of reported security training does not always correspond to the level of violence in a given environment, to the estimated prevalence and misuse of small arms, or to*

the level of personal threat expressed by respondents. Potentially more disconcerting, national staff are *half as likely* as expatriate staff to receive security training in many organisations.

*Those that have received security training, however, typically viewed the training or awareness as being “helpful” in dealing with the availability and misuse of small arms.* Security training or awareness is also associated with an increased tendency for individuals to take security precautions, such as walking with others or limiting local travel. The vast majority of respondents were unfamiliar with basic safety procedures associated with guns and ammunition, such as applying safety locks or the safe storage of weapons. Those who received security training, however, were no more knowledgeable about small arms safety than those who had not undertaken security training.

*The study’s two focus regions—the Balkans and Southeast Asia—revealed important differences with regard to the impacts of small arms availability and use on operations, personnel, and civilians.* In general, compared to respondents from the Balkans, respondents from Southeast Asia tend to report working in more violent or conflict-prone environments and to estimate more prevalence and misuse of small arms.

*Respondents from both regions frequently reported seeing handguns, but Southeast Asia respondents were much more likely than Balkans respondents to report having seen assault rifles.* Southeast Asia respondents were more likely than Balkans respondents to indicate assault rifles as the leading cause of death and injury among civilians, to note the targeting of civilians with assault rifles, and to indicate awareness of unintentional death or injury of civilians due to assault rifles. There were no significant differences between the two regions in terms of reported use of arms against civilians for criminal or coercive purposes.

*In general, Southeast Asia respondents more frequently reported operational hindrances than did Balkans respondents.* Moreover, they rated armed attacks on relief workers and armed conflict between belligerents as more significant hindrances to operational effectiveness than did Balkans respondents. Despite these trends, respondents from Southeast Asia expressed less negative attitudes toward small arms than did respondents from the Balkans, potentially indicating a complex relationship among security environments, region, and small arms availability and misuse.

## **Box 2: A brief history of the process**

Surveys are time and resource consuming processes. This study is no exception. Vital ingredients to its success include continuous communication with stakeholders, the genuine participation of agencies in designing the survey instrument and managing the distribution of questionnaires, and physical contact with both administrators at headquarters and prospective respondents. A timeline of the 2001–2003 process is included below.

### **2001**

#### **November**

Conference held in Geneva with agency representatives, public health specialists, security personnel, and academics to solicit strategic input and to consider methodological issues associated with the questionnaire.

#### **November–December**

Pilot testing the questionnaire and the designing of materials introducing and explaining the project to participants.

### **2002**

#### **January–March**

Pre-testing and translation of the questionnaire and initial contact with several potential participating agencies.

#### **April–June**

Secured the agreement of several agencies to participate in the survey. The circulation of information on procedures for sending out and distributing questionnaires to headquarter and country offices.

#### **July–September**

Visited several offices of participating agencies in the Balkans and Southeast Asia to promote questionnaire distribution and clarify procedures as well as frequent contact with agencies to support their efforts.

#### **August–November**

Received completed questionnaires; developed information management and data entry systems; followed-up low return rate areas to increase response rates; and began preliminary data analysis for individual agency reports.

#### **November–December**

Completed data analysis and writing of individualised reports for participating agencies (i.e. those with adequate response rates for meaningful statistical analysis).

### **2003**

#### **January–February**

Distributed confidential agency reports to participating agencies; and the analysis and drafting of the final interagency report.

#### **March**

Held a stakeholders meeting in Geneva to receive feedback from agencies regarding their individual agency reports and the initial findings for the final interagency report.

#### **April–June**

Final interagency report written.

#### **July**

“In the Line of Fire” launched at the First Biennial Meeting of states to consider the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (New York, July 7–11, 2003) and disseminated widely to hundreds of organisations.


#### **September**

Next phase of the survey begins...

# Respondent profiles

- At least 80% of respondents were nationals of the country in which they were working, while 18% were expatriates (with 2% unspecified). See Appendix II for more detailed information on countries and response rates;
- The average age of respondents was 36, though ages ranged from 20 to 70;
- The average respondent had worked for approximately 5 and ¼ years in the country in which they were stationed;
- Approximately 59% of respondents were male, 39% female, and 2% were unspecified;
- Questionnaires were completed in several languages, including English (62%), Khmer (14%), Albanian (10%), Serbian (7%), Spanish (7%), and French (2%);<sup>9</sup>
- The majority of respondents indicated they were “full time” employees of the organisation for which they worked;
- Respondents reported working in a wide variety of sectors, with larger numbers indicating “health (including nutrition)” (25%), “education” (22%), “water and sanitation” (21%), “protection, human rights/rule of law” (15%), “economic recovery and infrastructure development” (16%), “food security” (14%), and “other” (33%, including a wide variety of activities such as “administration”, “finance”, “micro-finance”, and “disability”, among others; see question #9e, appendix 1).<sup>10</sup>

**Figure 1: An inventory of survey respondents**



9. The sums total more than 100% due to rounding.

10. The sum totals to more than 100% due to multiple sectors of work being reported by individuals.

# Specific findings

## Security contexts


In order to generate a better understanding of how respondents perceive the context in which they are working, they were asked to “describe the security environment (e.g. reported numbers of intentional deaths, injuries and criminal violence)” of the location where they operate, using a four-point scale ranging from “little or no violence” to “widespread conflict/war” (see question #12, appendix 1).

Over 40% of individuals claimed to be working in an environment characterised by a “moderate level of social or criminal violence”, while over one third reported their local security environment as having “little or no violence”. Approximately 15% of respondents described their local security environment to be characterised by “high levels of social or criminal violence”, and 7% reported “widespread conflict/war” (see figure 2).


Predictably, security environments were not rated similarly across countries. Among the 15 countries with more than 10 respondents offering assessments of their local security environment, Sri Lanka and the Philippines were on average rated as having the most violent or conflict-prone environments, while Thailand and Laos were rated as having the lowest levels of violence.

Several countries had a significant amount of variation in terms of how individual respondents rated their local security environments. It should be recalled that such in-country variation in the perceived security environment—as well as other assessments reported below—can be attributed to a host of factors, including differing work locations, divergent sectors/types of work across respondents, and attitudinal and behavioural differences between individuals themselves.<sup>11</sup>

A central question for the study was to determine the extent to which the prevalence and misuse of small arms shaped the security environment assessments offered by humanitarian and development personnel. In order to address this question, a “preva-



**Figure 3. A dangerous equation: Increasing small arms prevalence and misuse = increasing insecurity**



lence and misuse” index was constructed. This (composite) index is comprised of several factors, including:

- respondents’ estimates of the level of civilian possession of small arms;
- respondents’ reports of the number of groups (excluding the military, police, and private security) they have actually seen in possession of small arms;
- the variety of locations where small arms are reportedly encountered by respondents;
- respondents’ reports of incidents of small arms misuse against civilians; and
- whether the respondent or any of the respondent’s colleagues has been victimised by individuals using small arms.

This index combines fairly “objective” characteristics of the respondent’s reported security situation *vis-à-vis* small arms, and can be conceived as a combination of perceived small arms prevalence and misuse.<sup>12</sup>

To what extent does the small arms prevalence and misuse index correspond to individuals’ estimates of the level of violence or conflict in their local environments? Establishing this relationship could shed light on the extent to which small arms prevalence and misuse contributes to an overall assessment of the level of violence in the local work environment. A close examination reveals a strong relationship between the two (see figure 3).

11. Although most of the information contained in this report involves “subjective” estimates, two important caveats should be kept in mind. First, detailed “objective” information on small arms of the nature being investigated here has its own limitations and biases—ranging from inaccuracies in reported data to the simple lack of record keeping in countries and relevant organisations. Thus, although subjective in nature, information from individuals can be viewed as simply another—albeit limited—source. Second, and more importantly for the aims of the current investigation, the subjective experiences of individuals are likely a key factor in determining the responses—both psychological and behavioural—of individuals to their circumstances. Objective assessments of the number and variety of weapons, the levels of violence, and the frequency of death and injury are valuable in making assessments of prevailing conditions, trends, and the like, and provide an important benchmark against which policies and programmes can be evaluated. But objective statistics often fail to account for subjective experiences, which can only be obtained through investigations focusing on individuals and their experiences.

12. This index weighs each factor equally. Due to the small number of respondents reporting the highest level of prevalence and misuse, the highest two categories were collapsed, thus creating a five-point scale ranging from very low (0) to very high (4). Questions used in the construction of this index are: #11, #13, #14, #20b, #22b, #26i, #26ii, and #26v; see appendix 1.

**“According to a review of reports in the Relief Web document database for the years 1997–2001 almost half of the non-accidental deaths of workers resulted from ambushes on vehicles or convoys, carried out by armed bandits or rebel groups”<sup>13</sup>**

Analysis shows that, by far the best predictor of the perceived local security environment is the level of prevalence and misuse of small arms, even when taking into account such factors as the age of respondent, citizenship, gender, attitude toward small arms, and overall knowledge about small arms.


A wide variety of security environments were reported by respondents, ranging from little or no violence to widespread conflict or war. The most violent or conflict-prone areas are not isolated to a particular geographic location, as the five “highest violence” countries are in different regions of the world. On average Sri Lanka and the Philippines had the highest reported level of violence, while those working in Thailand and Laos reported the lowest levels of violence. Individuals who detected more availability and misuse of small arms also tended to report higher levels of violence and conflict in the areas where they work.

### Small arms at the local level

A central finding is that small arms are frequently encountered by personnel in multiple locations during the course of their work. This was highlighted by responses to four questions:

- who is known to possess weapons;
- what types of weapons are observed in the possession of different groups;
- what are the specific locations where small arms are seen; and

**Figure 4. Who's got the guns? Groups known to possess weapons<sup>14</sup>**



13. King, Dennis (2002), *Paying the Ultimate Price: An Analysis of Aid-Worker Fatalities*, ODI HPN Report.

14. Note that women and children are a part of all or most of the other categories as well.

- what is the prevalence of small arms possession among the civilian population.<sup>15</sup>

*Who is holding the weapons:* More than 97% of respondents indicated that they were aware of one or more groups in possession of weapons.<sup>16</sup> While virtually every respondent indicated being aware of armed military and police forces, a wide variety of other groups were also cited as having weapons (see figure 4).

Over 60% of respondents were aware of organised criminal groups in possession of weapons, and over half were aware of non-organised criminal elements, rebels or insurgents, paramilitary groups, and private security companies in possession of weapons. Over one third were aware of armed civilians.


Civilian possession of small arms appears to be widespread. When asked to estimate the prevalence of small arms possession in the civilian population, of those offering an estimate, over one quarter rated it as “moderate”, and close to one quarter rated it as “high” or “very high” (approximately one fifth either did not provide an answer or indicated that they did not know).

*What types of weapons:* In addition to an awareness of various groups in possession of weapons (see figure 4), workers also reported seeing a variety of weapons types with a large majority of respondents (91%) regularly observing handguns (e.g. pistols, revolvers), see figure 5.

Almost three quarters of respondents indicated having seen assault rifles being held by one or more groups, with somewhat fewer indicating having seen hand grenades, landmines, and mortars. Excluding the military and police/law enforcement, small

**“Small arms are almost a part of our lives in the Philippines, seeing them around is a part of everyday life, almost all movies have small arms stories, my neighbour has armed guards, lots of them, I go to market and I see stores heavily guarded, I go to school and I see people guarding those rich children, my office mate has a husband who is in the military, my husband bought a gun for my child”**  
 Oxfam GB, female, Philippines, two years service

**Figure 5. Types of small arms seen**




15. Results reported in this section refer to the following questions: #10, #11, #13, and #14; See appendix 1.

16. Groups included military forces, police and law enforcement, rebel or insurgent forces, organised criminal groups, non-organised criminal elements, paramilitary groups, private security groups, civilians, children, women, and “other” (see question #10, appendix 1).

arms of one type or another are frequently observed in the possession of private security forces (48%), rebels (41%), paramilitary groups (41%), organised criminal groups (36%), non-organised criminal elements (33%), and civilians (32%).<sup>17</sup> The presence of a wide variety of weapons—particularly military-style weapons—in the hands of such a diverse range of actors is characteristic of post-conflict environments. The findings discussed above reinforce the conclusions of other studies that suggest that even in post-conflict environments it is handguns and assault rifles, and not landmines, mortars or other forms of artillery, that are most ubiquitous.<sup>18</sup>

*Where are small arms seen:* The majority of respondents indicated having seen small arms in one or more specific locations, with over 40% indicating having seen small arms “in the field (other than aid delivery areas)”, and over one third indicating having seen small arms in personal residences (see figure 6).



## Impacts on operations

What role do small arms play, if any, in hindering organisations’ operations? This question drives to the heart of development and relief organisations’ mandates, as the consequences of operational disruptions are inevitably shouldered by the most vulnerable, the beneficiary populations. Several questions were designed to assess the impact of small arms availability and use on the activities of participating organisations.<sup>19</sup>

We have already noted the high frequency with which respondents report seeing small arms in “the field”. Personnel also indicated that armed attacks on relief workers were

17. It should be emphasised that the frequency of observing small arms in the possession of various groups will be influenced by a number of factors other than the actual prevalence of such weapons, including the nature of the group (i.e. private security forces presumably have some incentive to make their weapons visible, whereas groups such as civilians or criminals may not), the domestic laws regulating small arms possession, the specific location where the respondent works/lives, and the individual respondents’ “sensitivity” to small arms, among other factors. Indeed, many aid workers personally communicated to us a “desensitisation” regarding small arms.

18. See ICRC (1999); and Meddings, David and Stephanie O’Connor (1999), “Circumstances around Weapons Injury in Cambodia after Departure of a Peacekeeping Force: Prospective Cohort Study,” *British Medical Journal*, Vol. 319, pp. 412–415.

19. Results reported in this section refer to the following questions: #16, #17, #18, #19, and #34; see appendix 1.


an obstacle to effective operations, rating it an average of 3.5 on a 10-point scale.<sup>20</sup> A more significant arms-related concern was armed conflict between belligerents, which was rated at 3.9 out of 10. None of the potential obstacles queried in the questionnaire received an average rating above five out of 10, with “cooperation difficulties with host governments and municipal authorities” being the highest rated obstacle at 4.98 out of 10.

Some people (6%) reported operational interruptions during the last six months (prior to August 2002) due to evacuations resulting from security threats involving small arms. Reported suspensions or delays in operations during the last six months—due to either organised social violence such as crime or banditry, or as a result of armed conflict—were more frequently reported (13%). An even more compelling demonstration of the impact of arms on operations is that almost one in ten respondents indicated that between 20% and 40% of the “beneficiary population” was inaccessible as a result of armed security threats during the last six months, and approximately 7% indicated this figure to be higher than 40%.

Such obstacles do not, however, appear to strike evenly across different security environments (see figure 7). Higher frequencies of reported operational obstacles (e.g. suspensions or delays, evacuations, or inaccessible beneficiaries) are also related to the presence of small arms en route to or in designated areas, with over half who had seen small arms also reporting one or more recent operational obstacles.


The prevalence and misuse of small arms also appears to have a straightforward relationship to operational challenges. In other words, the greater the estimated prevalence and misuse of small arms, the more frequently operational obstacles are reported.

In areas where the estimated prevalence and misuse of small arms is rated as “very low” only about 10% of respondents reported one or more operational hindrances. In contrast, almost three quarters of respondents reported such obstacles in areas where the prevalence and misuse of small arms was rated as “very high” (see figure 8). High levels of small arms availability and misuse was an important factor in hindering the ability of organisations to fulfil their mandate of providing assistance to those in need.



20. This question had an unusually low response rate, with between 47% and 52% of respondents providing estimates of potential obstacles. Missing responses for this question were more frequent from individuals who reported working in less violent areas, nationals, those who expressed feeling personally threatened by small arms, and those completing the questionnaire in a language other than English.

**Figure 8. Operational obstacles and the prevalence and misuse of small arms**



In summary, in areas marked by higher levels of violence, and when small arms are encountered en route to or in aid delivery areas, obstacles to organisational operations are more likely. Importantly, the prevalence and misuse of small arms is also strongly related to reported hindrances to effective operations, including evacuations, suspensions or delays, and rendering beneficiaries inaccessible.

### Impacts on civilians

Awareness of the exposure of civilians to insecurity is a key aspect in understanding the broader security context in areas where humanitarian and development agencies operate. It is also important in helping agencies determine priorities, allocate scarce resources and measure the potential effectiveness of various programmes and projects. Questions

were designed to assess the situation of civilians with regard to their exposure to small arms misuse.<sup>21</sup> In general, personnel estimate that the civilian population is exposed to high levels of armed violence in their areas of work. This includes the frequent targeting of civilians as well as unintentional death and injury to civilians caused by various small arms.

Of all weapon types, handguns were reported to be the most common vehicle leading to fatal and non-fatal injuries among civilians.<sup>23</sup> Knives/blunt instruments, assault rifles, and landmines were also frequently noted as a leading cause of civilian death and injury. Hand grenades and mortars were somewhat less frequently assessed as the cause of death or injury among civilians (see figure 9).


**“Firearm homicide rates for UN personnel were estimated to be between 18 and 25 per 100,000 between 1990 and 2000. By comparison, the UK, France and Switzerland have firearm homicide rates below 3 per 100,000”<sup>22</sup>**

21. Results reported in this section refer to the following questions: #15 and #26i, #26ii, and #26v; see appendix 1.

22. Muggah, Robert and Eric Berman (2001).

23. Many respondents selected more than one weapon type as being most frequently the direct cause of civilian death or injury. Thus, sums across weapon types total to more than 100%.


**Figure 9. Small arms and civilian death/injury**



When focusing exclusively on handguns and assault rifles, we notice that estimates tended to vary according to the environment in which respondents were operating (see figure 10). In areas characterised by little or no violence, 40% of respondents reported handguns to be the weapon most frequently causing civilian death and injury, whereas fewer than 20% of respondents made the same assessment for assault rifles. In areas marked by widespread conflict or war, assault rifles eclipsed handguns as the leading cause of weapons-related death and injury among civilians.

Over 40% of personnel said that they were aware of the use of arms against civilians for criminal or coercive purposes, and of these, almost 60% said that this occurred daily, weekly or monthly. One quarter said that they were aware of unintentional death or injury among civilians due to assault rifles, with almost three quarters of these indicating that this occurred every six months or less, monthly, weekly, or daily. Almost one-in-three respondents said that they were aware of the targeting of civilians with assault rifles, with almost 80% of those reporting such incidents indicating this occurred at least every six months.

**Figure 10. Under the gun:  
Comparing casualty rates from handguns and assault rifles**



In summary, respondents reported that civilians are frequently victimised, targeted, injured or killed by small arms. Handguns are the weapon most frequently attributed to civilian weapons-related deaths and injuries, and handguns and assault rifles are seen to be involved in a wide variety of security threats to civilians.

### Small arms and relief personnel: Insecurity and responses

A number of questions were asked in order to gauge perceptions of staff regarding their personal safety, sense of threat, and security preparedness.<sup>24</sup>

*Security incidents:* More than one-in-10 personnel reported having been the victim of a “security incident” (e.g. assault, robbery, intimidation, harassment, detention, kidnapping, sexual violence, etc.), within the last six months. Among those having recently experienced a security incident, 40% reported that a weapon was involved. Incidents included armed assault (11 respondents), a weapon being fired in their presence (7), a weapon being used to threaten or harass them (23), ongoing threat of landmines (5), and kidnapping (13). Three individuals reported suffering injuries from a security incident involving small arms. It should be recalled that these reported incidents extended only to the *previous six months*, and not the overall time spent by workers in their various locations.

Perhaps more disconcerting is that over one in five personnel reported colleagues having experienced a security incident, with 60% of these reporting that the incident involved a weapon. Such incidents included armed robbery, intimidation or harassment, assault, detention, kidnapping, and the ongoing threat of landmines. Some respondents

#### **Box 3. Dangerous times: Exposure of UN workers to insecurity**

15.08.02	UN condemns abduction of aid worker in Dagestan, Russian Federation <sup>25</sup>
04.09.02	UN hails release of staff member abducted recently in Mogadishu
26.09.02	UN refugee agency pays tribute to slain humanitarian relief workers
24.11.02	Afghanistan: UN envoy urges investigation of attack on aid workers
10.12.02	Security concerns keep UN from reaching refugee camp in Ethiopia
28.01.03	Security concerns force UN refugee agency to suspend operations in Côte d'Ivoire
31.01.03	Following three-day suspension, UN refugee agency resumes partial operations in Côte d'Ivoire
06.02.03	Citing security concerns, UN pulls non-essential staff out of Côte d'Ivoire
20.03.03	Côte d'Ivoire: UN official voices sorrow at killing of aid workers
28.03.03	UN agency relocates staff as new rebel clashes in Liberia engulf refugee camp
10.04.03	Senior UN relief official voices sorrow at death of Red Cross worker in Iraq
28.04.03	Sierra Leone commander pleads innocent to attacks on UN peacekeepers
29.04.03	As security improves UN agency resumes aid work in remote areas of Liberia
04.05.03	Attack on deminers in Afghanistan leaves one dead, UN reports
05.05.03	UN relief agency demands security guarantees from Liberian government
	Source UN News Service, <a href="http://www.un.org/News">www.un.org/News</a>

24. Results reported in this section refer to the following questions: #20a, #20b, #20c, #21a, #21b, #22a, #22b, #22c, #23a, #23b, #24a, #24b, #24c, #27, #29, #30, #31a, #31b, #32, and #33. See appendix 1.

25. On 12 August 2002 Arjan Erkel from Médecins Sans Frontières was abducted by three gunmen. For more information see [www.msf.org](http://www.msf.org)



Distributing food relief to 1,240 families, Gedabay, Azerbaijan.  
© ICRC/Boris Heger

(7%) indicated that colleagues had suffered injuries from incidents involving small arms. Of these, 35% indicated such injuries to be minor, 44% indicated serious injuries requiring hospitalisation, and 16% reported that the injuries sustained by their colleagues were fatal.


*Perception of threat from small arms:* An important question facing those charged with managing personnel security involves understanding the sources of and factors associated with threat perception. Feeling personally threatened is associated with a variety of both positive and negative individual responses. For example, feeling threatened may promote taking additional security precautions, but it will also likely increase psychological stress and can hinder individuals' ability to perform job-related tasks effectively. Inability to adequately carry out duties in the complex and dynamic environments that are characteristic of areas where most development and humanitarian personnel work is extremely dangerous for all staff. Understanding what promotes a sense of personal threat from small arms, who is likely to feel threatened, and what behavioural responses are associated with feeling threatened is thus an important concern.

Although most personnel have not recently experienced a security incident themselves, most still expressed a sense of personal threat due to small arms. Half of all respondents felt somewhat personally threatened and 15% felt very threatened, while just over one third expressed feeling no personal threat. In total, nearly two thirds of respondents indicated feeling threatened by small arms.

On average, a greater sense of threat to personal safety and security was expressed in areas marked by "high levels of social or criminal violence" than in any other type of security environment, including "widespread conflict/war". Further examination reveals that several additional factors are associated with feeling personally threatened by small arms (see figure 11).<sup>26</sup>

26. Based on multiple regression analysis with level of threat as the dependent variable and including all noted factors. Security training was marginally significant. All other determinations used standard criteria of .05 probability.

**Figure 11. A cause for concern:  
Assessing where people feel personally threatened**



The strongest factors associated with perceptions of threat included: (i) whether an individual was concerned about getting hurt or injured due to armed violence when they took their current position; (ii) citizenship; (iii) the respondent’s attitude toward small arms; and (iv) the estimated level of civilian possession of small arms. Each of these factors represents a particularly strong predictor of an individual’s level of threat perception from small arms (see table 1).

One issue that is especially germane to security procedures is the question of an “appropriate” sense of personal threat among personnel. Some individuals may actually report high levels of small arms-related insecurity, but not indicate a sense of personal threat. Such discrepancies between security environment and sense of personal threat are potentially of great consequence to the taking of appropriate security precautions—although more detailed research is required.

There are considerable discrepancies among respondents between the perceived security environment and small arms availability, on the one hand, and perceived exposure to personal threat. Table 2 ranks respondents according to the country in which they operate—and provides a comparative snapshot. Cambodia, for example, ranks 11th among the 15 countries in terms of both the level of violence in the local security environment and the reported prevalence and misuse of small arms. Respondents from

**Box 4. Factors influencing threat perceptions**

**Factors promoting threat perception from small arms**

- Working in areas perceived to have higher levels of violence/conflict
- Being a national of the country in which currently working
- Being concerned about getting hurt or injured upon taking current position
- Viewing attacks on relief workers as a more significant obstacle to effective operations
- Offering higher estimates of civilian possession of small arms

**Factors reducing threat perception from small arms**

- Having had security training within the organisation
- Having a more favourable (less negative) overall attitude toward small arms

**Factors unrelated to threat perception from small arms**

- Gender
- Age
- Having been personally victimised within the last six months
- Knowledge of small arms

**Table 1. Country scores and rankings on security environment, small arms prevalence and misuse, personal threat perceptions, and security training**

The table below compares a number of survey findings across countries. It ranks countries according to four variables drawn from the survey: (i) the security environment; (ii) the prevalence and misuse of small arms (index); (iii) the level of personal threat perception from small arms; (iv) and the percentage of respondents reporting having had security training within the organisation for which they currently work. In very general terms, it finds that respondents working in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Guatemala, El Salvador and Uganda report the highest levels of insecurity, small arms prevalence and misuse, personal threat and lowest exposure to security training.<sup>27</sup>

Country (# reporting)	Security environment (1-4)	Prevalence & misuse index (1-3)	Personal threat level (0-4)	Percent reporting security training
	Score (rank)	Score (rank)	Score (rank)	
<b>Sri Lanka</b> (12)	3.00 (1)	2.50 (4)	2.14 (4)	7%
<b>Philippines</b> (47)	2.72 (2)	3.19 (1)	1.94 (7)	32%
<b>Guatemala</b> (12)	2.67 (3)	2.23 (6)	2.15 (3)	0%
<b>El Salvador</b> (14)	2.57 (4)	2.71 (2)	2.36 (1)	0%
<b>Uganda</b> (11)	2.55 (5)	2.64 (3)	2.21 (2)	0%
<b>Albania</b> (13)	2.08 (6)	2.14 (8)	1.38 (13)	43%
<b>Afghanistan</b> (14)	2.00 (7)	2.50 (4)	2.00 (6)	44%
<b>Rwanda</b> (11)	2.00 (7)	1.64 (9)	1.55 (10)	18%
<b>Yugoslavia</b> (17)	1.82 (9)	2.18 (7)	1.53 (11)	6%
<b>Bosnia</b> (56)	1.77 (10)	1.48 (10)	1.82 (8)	20%
<b>Cambodia</b> (77)	1.73 (11)	1.39 (11)	2.10 (5)	7%
<b>Kosovo</b> (101)	1.58 (12)	1.18 (14)	1.81 (9)	15%
<b>India</b> (40)	1.55 (13)	1.35 (12)	1.49 (12)	3%
<b>Thailand</b> (16)	1.44 (14)	1.41 (13)	1.24 (14)	18%
<b>Laos</b> (14)	1.29 (15)	0.71 (15)	1.14 (15)	7%


Cambodia, however, report a fairly high level of personal threat perceptions, ranking 5th and scoring on average 2.1 on a three-point scale.

Conversely, respondents from the Philippines report the second most violent or conflict-prone local security environments, and report the greatest prevalence and misuse of small arms. They, however, rank 7th among the 15 countries in terms of reported level of personal threat perception. Cambodian respondents feel, for lack of a better expression, “over-threatened” while Philippine respondents feel “under-threatened” relative to their security environment and small arms prevalence and misuse. Similar to respondents from the Philippines, respondents from Albania also appear somewhat personally “under-threatened” by small arms in comparison to both their local security environment and the prevalence and misuse of small arms.

The table also tentatively indicates that the availability of training is uneven—and not necessarily related to the perceived security environment or level of personal threat.

27. It should be emphasised, however, that discrepancies between individuals’ sense of personal threat and their ratings of the security environment may point toward a tendency to under-appreciate security risks. The frequency of security training for personnel can also be evaluated relative to these various security-related factors.

**Figure 12. Security training**



In three of the countries reported as having the highest level of violence (i.e. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Uganda) no respondent indicated having received security training, and only 7% of respondents from the highest violence-affected country (i.e. Sri Lanka)

indicated receiving security training. In contrast, one fifth of respondents in Bosnia reported having received security training despite reporting both lower levels of violence and lower prevalence and misuse of small arms. Similarly, nearly one fifth of respondents from Thailand indicated having received security training, while Thailand was among the least violent countries, with relatively low levels of small arms prevalence and misuse.

*Responses to insecurity:* Organisations are increasingly operating in hazardous conditions and are facing threats to both their personnel and their operational effectiveness. Respondents were asked several questions regarding both their personal reactions (or behavioural responses) to

their security environment as well as the security protocol and procedures of the organisation for which they work.


People were asked whether they have had security training in the organisation for which they are currently working, and if so, how helpful that training was in coping with the availability and use of small arms (see figure 12). Fewer than one-in-five respondents reported having received security training with their organisation. Of the 95 respondents with security training, 11% indicated it was not helpful at all, 31% rated it as “somewhat helpful”, 34% rated it as “helpful”, and 14% rated it as “very helpful” in dealing with the availability and use of small arms (4% responded “don’t know”, and the remainder provided no assessment).

Those working in more violence-prone areas were more likely to have received security training. While only 14% reported security training in areas of “little or no violence”, about one quarter of those operating in areas of “widespread conflict or war” reported receiving security training.<sup>28</sup> Despite working in high violence and conflict-prone areas,

**“I would like to know if you or your organisation have some good examples/ contacts of campaign material, media campaign material, curriculum materials on how to avoid unintended injuries/killings in the context of storage of weapons or symbolic use of weapons (for instance in relation to various ceremonies, etc), which we could learn from here in Macedonia where it is strongly needed”**

UNDP, male, Macedonia, eight months service

**Figure 13. Discrepancies in training among respondents**



the vast majority of respondents do not receive security training within the organisation for which they work.

A potentially more alarming finding involves disparities in security training between national staff and expatriate staff. More than 30% of expatriate staff report receiving security training within their organisations, while only 14% of national staff indicate having received any security training from the organisation for which they work. This finding would concur with the observations of Van Brabant, who noted that: “there are thousands of aid workers in violent environments who have had hardly any security training. That need is not being met because there are problems with supply and demand.”<sup>29</sup> Despite the fact that the majority (80%) of respondents were national staff, they were less than half as likely to receive security training (see figure 13).

A related issue involves the level of knowledge personnel have about the types and features of small arms. Overall, most respondents indicated very little familiarity with small arms, with over 60% professing no knowledge or familiarity with basic weapons features or weapons safety procedures (see figure 14).

Although staff are understandably focused on the work at hand, the frequency with which small arms are encountered during both operational and non-operational activities potentially points toward the value of basic knowledge of small arms. The lack of such knowledge is most poignantly illustrated by the lack of awareness among respondents of even the most elementary safety procedures, such as how to apply safety locks (10%), how to safely store weapons (13%), and how to render various weapons inoperable (12%). In response to an open-ended question, many respondents specifically suggested that they would find training in such procedures valuable.


**“National staff do not [always] receive the security and support afforded their international colleagues, including remuneration and insurance, nor are they as respected for their credentials, experience, and knowledge of local culture”<sup>30</sup>**

28. Each respondent, of course, can interpret the meaning of “security training” differently, and no attempt was made within the questionnaire to further define security training. This will be refined in future versions to include security awareness procedures, as formal training is not always appropriate or required in particular contexts. Respondents, however, were given the opportunity to provide feedback about what additional information they would find valuable in dealing with small arms.

29. Van Brabant, Koenraad (2000), *Security Training: Where We Are Now?*, ODI HPN Report.

30. Danieli, Yael (ed.) (2002), *Sharing the Front Line and the Back Hills: Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid Workers and the Media in the Midst of Crisis*, Amityville, Baywood Pub Co., New York.

**Figure 14. Disarming questions: Staff knowledge about small arms**



Given the extensiveness of small arms availability and use, effective security training and awareness procedures should arguably focus attention on safety mechanisms related to small arms. To what extent do individuals who report having received security training

**“How to tell if an AK-47 is cocked/safety off.  
Was robbed at gunpoint a few years ago ...”**


Concern Worldwide, male, Uganda, six years service

also express more knowledge of basic features and safety procedures about small arms? Even when controlling for other important factors that may influence knowledge levels such as perceived security environment, age, gender, citizenship, and general attitude toward small arms,

security training does not seem to impact individuals’ average level of factual and safety knowledge regarding small arms. Given the important role the availability and use of small arms appears to play in shaping individuals’ security environments, this begins to suggest a significant disjuncture between security training and security risks.

The use of private security in response to rising levels of insecurity is a contentious issue in the humanitarian and development communities and will likely continue to be so for some time to come. Approximately 17% of all respondents indicated the use of armed guards, with two thirds of these indicating the use of armed guards at offices

**Figure 15. A matter of safety:  
The effects of security training on risk-avoidance behaviour**



**“For international staff moving for the first time from countries where weapons are not visible, to conflict affected countries where they are highly visible, more practical training about small arms may also help people to adjust to the different environment. Even when the high presence of small arms does not result in a direct threat against staff, the potential threat needs to be considered in all our programme activities eg. negotiations about beneficiary selection, locations of facilities, etc. This requires skilled staff and means good community processes are vital, which increases the time it takes to implement programmes even when they are not suspended or delayed due to actual violent conflict or incidents”**

Oxfam GB, female, Philippines, eight years service

or field sites. Among those responding to a question regarding why armed guards were being used, 37% said the use of armed guards was a decision made from agency headquarters, while about the same percent indicated it to be a country or local agency initiative. Among those offering an assessment (68 respondents), 62% indicated feeling that armed guards increased their personal safety, 31% felt there was no noticeable impact on their personal safety, and 7% indicated that armed guards decreased their personal safety.

Respondents also indicated the kinds of behaviour they have personally engaged in as a response to the availability or use of small arms. Despite the fact that over four-fifths of respondents indicated having no significant concerns about getting hurt or injured due to armed violence when they took their current job, many reported taking basic security precautions in response to small arms availability.

Nearly one quarter of respondents attempted to find someone to accompany them during local travel (e.g. walking in groups, staying near others), and 14% reported limiting or reducing their local travel. In total, close to half of humanitarian and development personnel reported engaging in one or more actions in response to the presence of small arms. Behavioural changes, however, were somewhat more frequently reported by those having had security training within their organisations (see figure 15).

**Box 5: Issues for further investigation**

One of the objectives of this study was to generate critical awareness of small arms availability and misuse. In doing so, this report raises many more questions than it answers. A number of especially important areas that require further study are highlighted below—many of which are currently being explored by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Small Arms Survey.

**1. Gender and perceptions of security**

The differentiated way that male and female workers experience armed insecurity is generally under-researched and worthy of intensive study.

**2. A comparative assessment of security procedures and protocol among humanitarian and development agencies**

Given the exceedingly high turnover of relief and development personnel and the different security procedures and protocols among agencies more research should be devoted to exploring institutional cultures and the relative effectiveness of training as it relates to weapons availability.

**3. The inclusion of “small arms awareness” in security training**

A fundamental, if unanswered, question remains concerning the potential benefits of including a basic weapons awareness component in security training (e.g. different weapons types, the firing range of specific weapons-types, the application of safety locks, etc). There are diverging opinions about the relevance of small arms awareness in training.

**4. Alternative forms of policing in refugee camps**

An examination of alternative policing and security techniques could potentially be useful in thinking about innovative ways of improving security for beneficiaries and workers, as well as transforming cultures of violence and weapons misuse. Some early work has begun in this regard (see Crisp, 2001) and further investigation could usefully stimulate dialogue about the effectiveness or otherwise of community policing techniques to improve civilian security, and positive multipliers for workers.<sup>31</sup>

31. See Crisp, Jeff (2001), *Lessons Learned from the Implementation of the Tanzania Package*.

## Focus regions: The Balkans and Southeast Asia

Two regions of the world, the Balkans and Southeast Asia, were specifically targeted by this study. The distribution of returned questionnaires reflects nearly equal numbers received from each of these regions, with a total of 199 questionnaires (33%) coming from the Balkans and 192 (32%) coming from Southeast Asia. These two regions represent approximately two thirds of the total number of questionnaires received, with the remainder (34%) coming from various other locations around the world.


Further analysis reveals that respondents from Southeast Asia tend to report higher levels of violence or conflict in their local work environments than respondents from the Balkans. Similarly, Southeast Asia respondents indicate greater prevalence and misuse of small arms than Balkans respondents.

Variation within each region was significant, particularly within the Southeast Asia region. On average, respondents from Laos indicated the level of violence or conflict within the local security environment to be 1.29 on a four-point scale. In contrast, the Philippines received an average score of 2.72, making it the most violent/conflict-prone country in either focus region. Countries within the Balkans region showed similar, although less dramatic, variation.

This decreased variation is also reflected across respondents. While comparable percentages of respondents in the Balkans and Southeast Asia indicated their local security

**“According to different mass-media in Kosovo, there are still a lot of different types of firearms, which puts the stabilisation of the situation in danger and causes different crimes—organised and unorganised. It would be better that all the arms be confiscated and eliminated, with only the police and military carrying weapons”**

CARE, male, Dubrov-Ferizoj, three years service



## “I am based in Northern Kosovo. Armed conflict and security issues affect our operations to a greater extent here than in other parts of Kosovo”

World Vision, female, Kosovo, one year of service


environments to be characterised by little or no violence, no individual working in the Balkans characterised his or her local security environment as one of widespread conflict or war. In contrast, nearly 10% of respondents in Southeast Asia indicated widespread conflict or war to be characteristic of their local security environment (see figure 16).

Estimates of the level of civilian possession of small arms also varied between the two focus regions. The distribution of responses within the Balkans region represents a normal “bell-curve”, with the largest number indicating a moderate level of civilian possession of small arms, with fewer individuals indicating both very low and very high levels of civilian possession. In contrast, responses from Southeast Asia are more linear, with the greatest number of respondents indicating only very low levels of civilian possession, and the fewest respondents indicating very high levels of civilian possession.


In sum, the security environment, the estimated prevalence and misuse of small arms, and the level of civilian possession of small arms all reveal differences between the two focus regions. Additionally, compared to respondents from the Balkans, Southeast Asia respondents more frequently report having seen various types of small arms. Although this difference is nominal for handguns (95% of respondents from Southeast Asia report having seen handguns compared to 90% from the Balkans), it is more dramatic for other types of small arms. In particular, 87% of respondents from Southeast Asia report having observed assault rifles, compared to 59% of respondents from the Balkans (figure 17).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, compared to respondents from the Balkans, nearly twice the percentage of Southeast Asian respondents (31%) indicated assault rifles to be the most common vehicle leading to fatal and non-fatal injuries among civilians. Southeast Asia respondents (30%) more frequently than Balkans respondents (17%) also noted the targeting of civilians with assault rifles as well as unintentional death or injury of civilians due to assault rifles (34% versus 22%). In contrast, there was only a marginal difference between the two focus regions in terms of reported use of arms against civilians for criminal or coercive purposes.

**Figure 17. Comparing small arms types in the Balkans and Southeast Asia**



**Figure 18. Stalled operations in the Balkans and Southeast Asia**




Personnel in Southeast Asia on average rated armed attacks on relief workers as a more significant hindrance to operational effectiveness than did Balkans respondents (4.3 compared to 2.6 on a 10-point scale). Similarly, on average armed conflict between belligerents was rated as a more significant obstacle to operational effectiveness by Southeast Asia respondents (five on a 10-point scale) than by Balkans respondents (2.9 on a 10-point scale). Respondents from Southeast Asia were also more likely to report operational obstacles (suspensions or delays, evacuations, or inaccessible beneficiaries) than were respondents from the Balkans.

Despite the previously noted differences between respondents from the two focus regions with regard to various small arms issues, on average Southeast Asia respondents expressed a somewhat less negative (more positive) attitude toward small arms than did Balkans respondents. Although both sets of respondents reported negative attitudes toward small arms, Balkans respondents' attitudes were even more negative than those of Southeast Asian respondents. One possibility is that such differences are in part culturally conditioned. Although attitudes toward small arms among humanitarian and development workers presumably would not be a good indicator of attitudes held more broadly in the regions, these findings indicate the important role that cultural differences play across regions.

Respondents from the Balkans who were nationals of the country in which they were working expressed the most negative attitude toward small arms. In contrast, nationals working in Southeast Asia on average reported the least negative attitude toward small arms, putting the average between "somewhat negative" and "neither negative nor positive" (see figure 19).

**Figure 19. Staff attitudes toward small arms in the Balkans and Southeast Asia**



## Box 6. A vignette: Kosovo and Cambodia

**T**wo countries/territories, Kosovo and Cambodia, registered relatively high response rates with over 100 respondents each. Despite facing very different circumstances, respondents on average rated the level of violence or conflict of their local security environments similarly. On a four-point scale, Kosovo on average was rated at 1.58 while Cambodia was rated at 1.73—both among the least violent or conflict-prone countries examined in this study.

**“The traditional ‘gun culture’ of the Balkans, which is particularly strong among ethnic Albanians, makes it almost a prerequisite that every head of the family should possess a firearm. Experience shows that even those in possession of an official gun licence usually have a second undeclared weapon”<sup>36</sup>**

### **A brief overview of Cambodia and small arms availability**

A 30-year violent conflict came to an end in Cambodia between 1998–1999 following Pol Pot’s death and the decision by the Khmer Rouge to join the Government structures. The country has made progress towards recovery and reconstruction but still faces considerable structural challenges including corruption, an excessive military apparatus and unsustainable natural resource exploitation. Although the situation has improved greatly over the last three years, decades of conflict led to an extremely high availability of weapons. It was estimated in 2001 that there were over 500,000 small arms in the country,<sup>32</sup> and reports of black market transactions to Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia.

In 1999 the government declared private ownership of weapons to be illegal and requested international assistance in dealing with the problem. A series of public ceremonies have taken place at which over 126,000 weapons were destroyed,<sup>33</sup> and “Weapons for Development” projects which have resulted in the handing in of nearly 10,000 weapons.<sup>34</sup> In 2000 a National Commission for Weapons Management and Reform was created and all military small arms (estimated to be 250,000) are now being systematically registered and properly stored. Recent surveys indicate that over 90% of the population feels that weapons-related security has increased greatly over the past two years.<sup>35</sup>

### **A brief overview of Kosovo and small arms availability**

Kosovo was engulfed in a bloody conflict, which led to the 1999 bombing campaign by NATO. In June 1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) signed an agreement with the international protection force KFOR to hand over all weapons except hunting rifles and pistols within 90 days, but disarmament and later initiatives to confiscate and destroy weapons did not prove very successful. There are an estimated 350,000–480,000 small arms in Kosovo today, with the overwhelming majority—between 330,000 and 460,000—held by civilians.<sup>37</sup>

Although small arms trafficking is a particular worry in the Balkans, trade in Kosovo is limited due to the high presence of



Cambodian temple wall. © Getty Images

international and national security forces and the low profits involved.

Criminality on the other hand is prevalent in Kosovo, with small arms-related incidents such as homicide, assault and armed robbery more frequent than in other, similarly sized, countries in the region (e.g. Estonia and Hungary). The local population still relies heavily on their own weapons to ensure their security, particularly as the Serb population continues to express scepticism towards the Kosovo law enforcement agency, the Kosovo Protection Service. Among Albanian Kosovars, cultural factors continue to exert a strong influence on weapons ownership.

Nevertheless, a small arms baseline survey carried out by the Small Arms Survey on behalf of UNDP-Kosovo reveals that almost half the population believes that there are “too many guns in society”, and over 50% of respondents thought it “likely” or “somewhat likely” that people in their neighbourhood would hand in their guns in exchange for investments in their community.<sup>38</sup>

Despite these similarities, respondent perspectives towards small arms differed in important ways. Respondents working in Cambodia tended to have more favourable attitudes toward small arms than those working in Kosovo. As noted earlier, attitudes toward small arms was an important factor relating to perception of threat, with those holding more favourable attitudes expressing less sense of threat from small arms.

Another factor distinguishing respondents in Cambodia from those in Kosovo is the extent to which they encounter small arms in various locations. Over 90% of those working in Cambodia reported seeing small arms in one or more specific locations (e.g. offices, personal residences, aid programs), while fewer than half of the Kosovo respondents reported seeing small arms in specific locations.

**“Discourage people, especially police personnel to avoid using small arms to fire at civilians. If possible, I would like to see the Cambodian Government have a better system to control small arms. Can the Government reduce their expenditure on military, but increase national budget on health and education?”**

Concern Worldwide, male, Cambodia, two years service

32. “Report on the Fact-Finding Mission to the Kingdom of Cambodia” of UN DDA, 21–30 January 2001.

33. As of March 2004.

34. Weapons for Development projects run by the European Union’s Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons (EU ASAC) (2001–2003); Japan Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC) (2003–present) and Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP) (2001–present).

35. See EU ASAC website [www.eu-asac.org](http://www.eu-asac.org) for details of surveys undertaken in 2002 and 2003.

36. *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (2001), “How Many Weapons in Macedonia?,” 24 August.

37. Small Arms Survey (2003), *Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kosovo*, Independent Report Commissioned by the UNDP.

38. Small Arms Survey (2003).

# Methodological considerations

*The 'sample' range:* Organisations were selected for inclusion in this study based on three or more of the following factors:

- their global reach;
- the diversity of their operational environments;
- their presence in the two focus regions of the study—Southeast Asia and the Balkans;
- their primary focus in either humanitarianism or development (broadly defined);
- existing relationships and contacts among organisational representatives and project team members.

Each organisation's headquarters was contacted by project members via a letter describing the project, its aims, methodology, timeline, and relevance in relation to personnel security. Additionally, organisations were either visited or contacted directly by project team members requesting their participation in the study.

*Distribution and return:* Upon agreeing to participate, each agency's headquarters was asked to distribute information to country offices regarding the nature of the project and instructions regarding the distribution of questionnaires to their personnel. Distribution to partner organisations (e.g. implementing agencies) was also encouraged.

Three methods for completing the questionnaire were made available to each office, including pen and paper versions, e-mail attachments, and a webpage where the questionnaire could be filled out online (password protected to ensure security). Wide distribution among personnel regardless of their position within the organisation was emphasised. Each country was given responsibility for distribution and collection of questionnaires, which were to be returned directly to their headquarters.

Project team members also visited selected countries in the focus regions of Southeast Asia and the Balkans, meeting with organisational representatives in several country offices. These meetings served to further clarify the project, the process of questionnaire distribution (and administration), and to answer any questions. Approximately 25 offices were visited. After the initial deadline for questionnaire return, the project team made follow-up contact with each organisation, advising them about response rates in various locations and asking them to encourage the return of questionnaires in locations where initial response rates were low.

Most questionnaires were returned from offices that had been personally visited by the project team. This underscores the importance of personal contact with organisations, but also highlights the difficulty of conducting a project such as this without significant participation and coordination from the organisations themselves.

*Response rates:* Calculating an overall response rate to the survey is difficult for several reasons. Firstly, the Centre and SAS had no direct control over the number of offices to which the questionnaire was sent. The project team relied on organisations themselves to distribute questionnaires to their country offices, and to instruct that it be completed by as many people as possible, regardless of their position in the organisation or their area of work.

Second, staff levels tend to change frequently as programmes scale up or down. Accurately establishing response rates under these conditions is difficult at best. Many agencies themselves could not establish denominator numbers for their total organisation. Nevertheless, based on available staff figures from some participating organisations, the number of responses received generally represents somewhat less than 1% of the total number of staff across all participating organisations. Recognising that the survey is not representative, the project team intends to expand coverage in the coming years.

*Methodological limitations:* The self-administered questionnaire (available in seven languages) generated a huge amount of information. There are several advantages associated with the methodology employed, such as comparative data generation across contexts and the generation of a large sample size. Nevertheless, this methodology also has certain limitations. An inherent challenge in survey research is that response rates, when they are known, can be very low, depending on such factors as the means (pen and paper, e-mail, webpage, etc.), the population being surveyed, and the level of interest to the subject itself.

Surveys—particularly self-administered surveys—also tend to be impersonal, which may be problematic when investigating issues involving a potentially high level of personal impact.

The survey, for example, asked questions regarding whether or not the respondent has been a victim of a security incident (such as assault, kidnapping, and sexual violence), whether they have personally been injured by small arms, whether their co-workers have experienced security incidents or been injured, and their personal sense of threat due to small arms. Methodologies employing more personal contact and face-to-face interaction—such as focus groups, interviews, or participatory appraisals—may in some ways be better suited for eliciting responses to such issues.

There is also a perception among many people that even providing detailed information about weapons can itself present risks to personnel. The questionnaire requested information on what groups possessed weapons (i.e. insurgent forces, paramilitaries, organized crime), what types of small arms they owned, and where personnel have encountered these weapons. As one respondent in Ethiopia bluntly indicated, “it is not safe to communicate about this topic.”

# Discussion

A plethora of challenges face personnel and organisations in today's humanitarian and development landscape. These run the gamut from recruiting appropriate personnel to finding effective ways of working with civilian populations in insurgent-controlled areas. Most, if not all of these challenges are made even more difficult—and more dangerous—by the near ubiquitous presence of small arms. In this light, one of the most basic tests for agencies involved in humanitarian relief and development operations

**“One of the factors aggravating poverty in CARE operational areas is sporadic conflict over access to natural resources. This conflict is exacerbated through proliferation of small arms and political instigation by the government. Addressing small arms proliferation is believed to contribute to peaceful sharing of resources to the development of the community”**

CARE, male, Ethiopia, eight years service

is to develop a better understanding of the role small arms availability play and how to respond to their presence and use. The findings of the study raise several key issues and concerns that merit further reflection.

Security training is one way in which organisations' personnel can be made more aware of the nature of the environments within which they work. Providing security training and awareness to more individuals is clearly a starting point, but security training may not in itself be an effective strategy if it neglects to better inform individuals about small arms. Indeed, those having received security training within their organisations were

no more knowledgeable about small arms and safety procedures—such as applying safety locks, or rendering a weapon inoperable—than those without training. Although it may be neither possible nor desirable to make personnel “arms experts”, given the frequency with which small arms are encountered in various locations, such training might well prove valuable. At a minimum, recognising where small arms are likely to be encountered can better prepare individuals for understanding the environment to which they are likely to be exposed.

The results of this study also highlight the fact that no two people see things exactly the same way. This is perhaps best understood not as an indictment on the accuracy

## **Next steps for the project: 2003–2004**

- Consolidating future survey work with current partners;
- Encouraging greater involvement of UN agencies;
- Incorporating the collection of deaths and injury data as experienced within partner organisations;
- Focussing on the Middle East and the Great Lakes, as well as two separate country foci on Angola and Afghanistan;
- Investigating the value of focussed studies on the issues flagged in box 5.

**“Humanitarian workers traditionally accept the sacrifice of personal comfort and safety in order to help others. Aid agencies are thus often embarrassed in some sense to champion their own security. But the result is an outcome deeply disruptive of the efforts to provide assistance in countries roiled with conflict and crisis. Access by agencies to minister to vulnerable populations can be effectively blocked by attacks on aid workers, which are tantamount to attacks on the system of humanitarian assistance itself. The international community must deal with this problem directly and robustly”<sup>39</sup>**

of “subjective” research but as a statement on the variation of human insecurity. To assume otherwise can result in a dangerous omission of the individual in the security equation.

In this light, a one-size-fits-all approach to increasing individual security may not be advisable. Important considerations, such as the level of violence and conflict in the area of work, the prevalence and misuse of small arms, and the probability of coming into contact with small arms according to one’s area of work can each help to tailor organisational procedures aimed at enhancing safety and security of personnel.

Directors and managers must make difficult decisions about how best to provide security for their personnel, balancing concerns about safety against populations in need with often scarce resources. The results of this study, however, suggest that the source for such information can be important, as individuals reporting from the local level may themselves be more or less exposed to different aspects of insecurity and have different perceptions of the level of violence, conflict, and risk. On average, for example, national staff reported feeling somewhat more personally threatened by small arms than did expatriate staff. The source of information used to make security-related policies, then, is an important consideration, and understanding who

### **Recent UN initiatives to address security concerns**

In September 2000, 14,000 UN staff from duty stations signed a petition calling for a special meeting of the Security Council to address staff security.

Every year since 2000, the Secretary-General submits a report to the General Assembly on the safety and security situation of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes intentional attacks against personnel “involved in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” a war crime. It entered into force on July 1, 2002. Very few cases have been prosecuted at national level.

In 1999, the UN enacted the 1994 *Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel*. However, the convention is not applicable to NGOs that do not have implementing/partnership agreements with the UN and its specialised agencies; nor does it apply to locally-recruited personnel.

In February 2000 a UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) was appointed by the Secretary-General to address the problem of ‘field security’ within the UN. As of October 2002, UNSECOORD had a staff of 100 international Field Security Officers and 200 support staff.

The World Health Organisation has proposed to the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee to set up a reference group that would develop standards and guidelines on the occupational health of humanitarian workers.

39. Helton, Arthur, “A Call for an Accountability Campaign,” in Danieli, Yael (2002).

is more likely to encounter and acknowledge such security risks may facilitate more effective decision-making.

This study is not the final word on the impacts of weapons availability on humanitarian and development personnel and programmes. One goal, however, has been to increase awareness of the issue of small arms and to highlight the value of conducting systematic assessments regarding safety and security issues for organisations, their personnel, and the civilians they assist. Studies such as this can target questions relevant to a wide variety of NGOs and UN agencies, but for the purposes of confidentiality it also will omit specific information that would be valuable for a particular organisation's needs.

In-house studies, conducted by each organisation, would be more ideally suited to gathering specific information deemed to be most relevant to operational activities, objectives, and local contexts. To that end, this study aims to familiarise organisations with the issue of small arms, provide some further insights into personal perceptions of arms availability, and promote the development of self-assessments by organisations themselves.

Many humanitarian and development agencies directly and indirectly expose their personnel to threatening and dangerous environments. Important considerations of neutrality and impartiality notwithstanding, this study injects new and compelling evidence that can inform these diverse organisations' engagement on the issue of small arms availability and misuse. Without accurate information on the impacts of weapons availability and misuse, it is difficult to render effective and meaningful policy or compel behavioural change.

Participating organisations are to be commended for participating in this endeavour and the Small Arms Survey and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue thank all the staff who responded to the questionnaire and those who assisted with the process itself.

On the occasion of the First Biennial Meeting reviewing the implementation of the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms, we contribute this report as one more piece of evidence about the preventable human cost of the trade in, *and* misuse of small arms. We urge the international community of governments to pay heed to the voices of those affected by this human security crisis.

# Appendix 1. Questionnaire

## Part 1. Respondent information

- (1) Name (Optional): .....
- (2) Gender (M or F): .....
- (3) Citizenship: .....
- (4) Age: .....
- (5) Marital Status (single or married): .....
- (6a) Do you have children? (Y/N) .....
- (6b) If yes, how many children: .....
- (7) Country in which you currently are stationed: .....
- (8) Beginning date of service in above country: ..... (month/year)
- (9a) Name of the organisation you work for: .....
- (9b) Job Title: .....
- (9c) Years of service in this organisation: ..... Field ..... Headquarters
- (9d) Type of service for this organisation: ..... (e.g. Full/Part-time, Volunteer, Consultant)
- (9e) What sector or programme best describes your work (place an "X" next to one of the following classifications)?
- ..... Protection, Human Rights/Rule of Law
- ..... Food Security
- ..... Agriculture Development
- ..... Shelter and Non-Food Items
- ..... Health (Including Nutrition)
- ..... Water and Sanitation
- ..... Education
- ..... Mine Action
- ..... Economic Recovery and Infrastructure Development
- ..... Other (Please specify): .....

For all of the following questions in this confidential survey *please answer for the country and time period you have indicated under questions 7 & 8 above.*

## Part 2. Security context

- (10) To the best of your knowledge, which of the following groups possess weapons: (Place an "X" next to all that apply).
- ..... military forces
- ..... police and law enforcement
- ..... rebel or insurgent forces

- ..... organised criminal groups
- ..... non-organized criminal elements
- ..... paramilitary groups
- ..... private security groups
- ..... civilians
- ..... children
- ..... women
- ..... other (please specify): .....
- ..... I do not know of any groups that possess weapons

(11) Please mark the kinds of weapons you have seen being held by the following groups in your area of work:

	Handguns	Assault rifles	Hand grenades	Landmines	Mortars <sup>1</sup>	Artillery <sup>2</sup>	Major weapon <sup>3</sup>	Other
Military								
Police								
Rebel								
Organised Crime								
Non-organised Crime								
Paramilitary								
Private security								
Civilians								
Children								
Women								
Other								

1. Mortars are launched from small systems that can be transported by one or two people on foot
2. Artillery include large system that cannot be transported by one or two people on foot
3. Major weapon systems are conventional weapons such as tanks or aircraft

(12) How would you describe the security environment (reported numbers of intentional deaths, injuries and criminal violence) of the location where you operate? (Circle the letter next to your answer).

- a. little or no violence
- b. moderate level of social or criminal violence
- c. high level of social or criminal violence
- d. widespread conflict/war

(13) Please indicate the location or locations in which you have seen small arms and related munitions. (Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- ..... personal residences
- ..... Offices
- ..... aid delivery areas
- ..... in route to aid delivery areas

..... in the field (other than aid delivery areas)

..... recreational areas

..... other (please specify): .....

..... I have not seen small arms in any locations

(14) In your estimation what is the prevalence of small arms possession in the civilian population:

- a. very low
- b. low
- c. moderate
- d. high
- e. very high
- f. don't know

(15) To the best of your knowledge which weapon was most frequently the direct cause of civilian death or injury in the country:

- a. blunt instruments and knives
- b. handguns
- c. assault/automatic rifles
- d. hand grenades
- e. landmines
- f. mortars (e.g. small system that can be transported by one or two people on foot)
- g. artillery (e.g. large system that cannot be transported by one or two people on foot)
- h. major weapon systems (e.g. tanks or aircraft)
- i. home-made guns
- j. don't know

### **Part 3. Operational security**

(16) In your estimation what proportion of the "beneficiary population" (your target group) were inaccessible as a result of armed security threats in the last six months:

- a. 0–20%
- b. 20–40%
- c. 40–60%
- d. 60–80%
- e. 80–100%
- f. don't know

(17) In the last six months, how often were your agency's operations suspended or delayed due to war or armed conflict:

- a. never
- b. once per 6 or more months
- c. once per 3–4 months
- d. once per month
- e. once per week

- f. several times per week
- g. don't know

(18) In the last six months, how often were your agency's operations suspended or delayed due to organised social violence—such as crime or banditry.

- a. never
- b. once per 6 or more months
- c. once per 3–4 months
- d. once per month
- e. once per week
- f. several times per week
- g. don't know

(19) In the last six months, has your agency evacuated staff from an area as a result of a direct security threat involving small arms?

- a. yes
- b. no
- c. don't know

(20a) Have you, personally, been a victim of a security incident (e.g. an assault, robbery, intimidation, harassment, kidnapping, sexual violence, etc.) in the last six months?

- a. yes
- b. no

(20b) If yes, did the incident involve a weapon?

- a. yes
- b. no

(20c) If yes, which type(s) of armed security incident occurred (Place an "X" by all that apply):

- ..... firing of weapon in your presence
- ..... armed assault
- ..... use of weapon to commit a robbery
- ..... use of weapon to threaten, intimidate or harass
- ..... ongoing threat of landmines hindered operations
- ..... kidnapping
- ..... other (please specify): .....

(21a) Since you took your current position, have you ever suffered any injuries as a result of incidents involving small arms?

- a. yes
- b. no

(21b) If yes, how extensive were your injuries?

- a. minor, not requiring hospitalisation and requiring no or little first aid treatment
- b. minor, not requiring hospitalisation but requiring significant first aid treatment
- c. serious, requiring hospitalisation, but not life-threatening

- d. serious, requiring hospitalisation, and potentially life-threatening
- e. I have been involved in more than one incident, with varying types of injuries

(22a) In the last six months, have any of your staff or work colleagues been involved in a security incident (e.g. such as assault, robbery, intimidation, harassment, kidnapping, etc.)?

- a. yes
- b. no
- c. don't know

(22b) If yes, did these incidents involve a weapon?

- a. yes
- b. no
- c. don't know

(22c) If yes, which type(s) of armed security incident occurred (place an "X" next to all that apply):

- ..... firing of weapon at or near "agency x" personnel
- ..... armed assault
- ..... use of weapon to commit a robbery
- ..... use of weapon to threaten, intimidate or harass
- ..... ongoing threat of landmines hindered operations
- ..... kidnapping
- ..... other (please specify): .....

(23a) Since you took your current position, have any of your staff or work colleagues ever suffered any injuries as a result of incidents involving small arms?

- a. yes
- b. no
- c. don't know

(23b) If yes, how extensive were their injuries?

- a. minor, not requiring hospitalisation and requiring no or little first aid treatment
- b. minor, not requiring hospitalisation but requiring significant first aid treatment
- c. serious, requiring hospitalisation, but not life-threatening
- d. serious, requiring hospitalisation, and potentially life-threatening
- e. serious, resulting in death
- f. there has been more than one incident, with varying types of injuries
- g. don't know

(24a) Does your agency office use armed guards in any areas where you operate (place an "X" next to all that apply)?

- ..... no
- ..... yes, at the office or field sites
- ..... yes, for staff transportation to and from the field
- ..... yes, for transportation of relief and/or materials to field sites

..... yes, at staff residence and/or staff dependents residence

..... don't know

(24b) If yes, why do you use armed guards?

- a. personal decision
- b. country or local agency initiative
- c. decision from agency headquarters
- d. decision made by UN or other security organ(s)
- e. decision by national or local government authorities

(24c) If yes to question 24a, do you feel that the presence of armed guards contributes to or reduces security in your area of operation?

- a. The presence of armed guards increases my personal safety
- b. The presence of armed guards has no noticeable impact on my personal safety
- c. The presence of armed guards decreases my personal safety

#### **Part 4. Effects on civilian population**

(25) Of the death and injury among the civilian population caused by weapons, please indicate below your estimate of the *proportion* caused by each of the following weapons:

(i) handguns (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. none b. very low c. low d. moderate e. high f. very high g. don't know

(ii) assault rifles (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. none b. very low c. low d. moderate e. high f. very high g. don't know

(iii) hand grenades (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. none b. very low c. low d. moderate e. high f. very high g. don't know

(iv) landmines (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. none b. very low c. low d. moderate e. high f. very high g. don't know

(v) mortars (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. none b. very low c. low d. moderate e. high f. very high g. don't know

(vi) artillery (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. none b. very low c. low d. moderate e. high f. very high g. don't know

(vii) major weapon systems (e.g. tanks or aircraft) (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. none b. very low c. low d. moderate e. high f. very high g. don't know

(26) Are you aware of the following occurrences:

(i) Targeting of civilians with assault rifles (circle the letter preceding your answer)

a. yes b. no c. don't know

If yes, did this occur:

a. daily b. weekly c. monthly d. every six months or less e. don't know

(ii) Unintentional death or injury among civilians due to assault rifles:

a. yes b. no c. don't know

If yes, did this occur:

- a. daily b. weekly c. monthly d. every six months or less e. don't know

(iii) Targeting of civilian areas with mortar or artillery fire:

- a. yes b. no c. don't know

If yes, did this occur:

- a. daily b. weekly c. monthly d. every six months or less e. don't know

(iv) Unintentional death or injury among civilians due to mortar or artillery fire:

- a. yes b. no c. don't know

If yes, did this occur:

- a. daily b. weekly c. monthly d. every six months or less e. don't know

(v) Use of arms against civilians for criminal or coercive purposes:

- a. yes b. no c. don't know

If yes, did this occur:

- a. daily b. weekly c. monthly d. every six months or less e. don't know

## Part 5. Impact on workers

(27) To what extent do you feel a threat to your personal safety and security due to the availability and use of small arms?

- a. I do not feel threatened at all
- b. I feel somewhat threatened
- c. I feel very threatened

(28) Indicate the location or locations in which you personally feel most threatened by small arms and related munitions. (Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- ..... personal residences
- ..... offices
- ..... aid delivery areas
- ..... in route to aid delivery areas
- ..... in the field (other than aid delivery areas)
- ..... recreational areas
- ..... other (please specify): .....
- ..... I do not feel threatened by small arms in any locations

(29). Thinking back to your decision to take your current job, which of the following were significant concerns to you? (Place an "X" next to all that apply).

- ..... being away from home, separation from family, or stress on family
- ..... money, costs, or lack of adequate income
- ..... getting sick or needing medical treatment
- ..... getting hurt or injured due to armed violence
- ..... having difficulty adjusting to your changed circumstances (institutional, cultural, physical)

- ..... other (please specify): .....
- ..... I had no significant concerns about taking my current job
- (30) What actions, if any, have you personally engaged in as a response to the availability or use of small arms? (Place an "X" next to all that apply).
- ..... tried to be accompanied during local travel (i.e. walking in groups, staying near others)
- ..... hired personal security guards
- ..... limited or reduced local travel
- ..... planned to terminate your appointment early
- ..... sought psychological counselling
- ..... other (please specify): .....
- (31a) Have you had security training within the organization for which you are now working?
- a. yes
- b. no
- (31b). If yes, to what extent has this training been helpful to you in coping with the availability or use of small arms?
- a. not helpful at all
- a. somewhat helpful
- b. helpful
- c. very helpful
- d. don't know
- (32) Which of the following things do you know about, or would be able to identify about various small arms: (Place an "X" next to all that apply).
- ..... the effective range of various weapons
- ..... different makes and models of various weapons
- ..... types of ammunition for various weapons
- ..... how to apply safety locks to various weapons
- ..... how to safely store various weapons
- ..... how to render various weapons inoperable
- (33) What additional training, if any, do you think might be valuable in dealing with the availability and use of small arms? (Write your response in the space below).
- (34) Using a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being "Not Significant at All" and 10 being "Very Significant", please rate the following potential obstacles to the effectiveness of your operations or programs. (Place a number from 1 to 10 in the blank next to each of the following):
- ..... poor quality or limited supplies
- ..... difficulties in coordinating among various agencies conducting relief operations
- ..... cooperation difficulties with the host government and municipal authorities
- ..... personnel challenges (e.g. low staffing levels, capacity & administrative challenges)
- ..... armed conflict between belligerents
- ..... armed attacks on relief workers
- ..... language and other communication difficulties

(35) Overall, how would you characterize your attitude toward small arms?

- a. very negative
- b. somewhat negative
- c. neither negative nor positive
- d. somewhat positive
- e. very positive

(36) Do you have any additional comments, concerns or issues either related or unrelated to this questionnaire that you would like to include?

(Write your response in the space below).

## Appendix 2.

<b>Questionnaires returned by country/territory</b>			
<b>Country/territory</b>	<b>Number returned</b>	<b>Country/territory</b>	<b>Number returned</b>
Afghanistan	16	Laos	14
Albania	14	Liberia	3
Angola	13	Macedonia	4
Armenia	1	Madagascar	1
Azerbaijan	1	Mozambique	2
Bangladesh	5	Pakistan	2
Bolivia	2	Palestine/West Bank	3
Bosnia	56	Peru	1
Burundi	1	Philippines	48
Cambodia	110	Russia	2
Colombia	1	Rwanda	11
DRC	3	Sierra Leone	9
Ecuador	1	Sri Lanka	14
El Salvador	14	Sudan	5
Ethiopia	11	Tajikistan	1
Georgia	9	Tanzania	5
Guatemala	13	Thailand	17
Haiti	1	Uganda	14
India	40	Vietnam	3
Kenya	1	Yugoslavia	17
Kosovo	108	Unspecified	5

# Appendix 3. Data

**Figure 1. An inventory of survey respondents**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid percent	Cumulative percent
<b>Valid</b>	Other	26	4.32	4.37	4.37
	CARE	176	29.24	29.58	33.95
	Concern	88	14.62	14.79	48.74
	HI	18	2.99	3.02	51.76
	MDM	22	3.65	3.7	55.46
	Merlin	6	0.99	1.01	56.47
	Oxfam GB	66	10.96	11.09	67.56
	SCF	45	7.48	7.56	75.12
	WV	71	11.79	11.93	87.05
	UNDP	59	9.8	9.92	96.97
	CBM	18	2.99	3.03	100
	Total	595	98.83	100	
<b>Missing</b>	System	7	1.17		
<b>Total</b>		602	100		

**Figure 2. Breaking-down security: Respondent perceptions of their security environment**

		Frequency	Percent
<b>Valid</b>	Little/no violence	186	34.6
	Moderate violence	230	42.8
	High violence	82	15.3
	Widespread conflict	39	7.3
	Total	537	
<b>Missing</b>	System	65	
<b>Total</b>		602	

**Figure 3. A dangerous equation: Increasing small arms prevalence and misuse = increasing insecurity**

\* Small arms prevalence & misuse (index) Crosstabulation count

Perceived security environment	Small arms prevalence & misuse (index)					
	Mean index score					
Little/no Violence	1.032258065					
Moderate violence	1.77826087					
High violence	2.707317073					
Widespread conflict	3.153846154					
Perceived security environment	Very low *0	Low*1	Moderate*2	High*3	Very high*4	
Little/no Violence	61	74	35	16		186
Moderate violence	26	74	65	55	10	230
High violence	3	11	17	27	24	82
Widespread conflict		1	8	14	16	39
<b>Total</b>	90	160	125	112	50	537
	61	74	70	48		1.032258
		74	130	165	40	1.778261
		11	34	81	96	2.707317
<b>Mean index score</b>		1	16	42	64	3.153846

<b>Figure 4. Who's got the guns? Groups known to possess weapons</b>	
	<b>Percent of respondents</b>
Military	97
Police/law enforcement	95.3
Rebels/insurgents	57.4
Organised crime	61.9
Non-organised crime	55.6
Paramilitary	51.4
Private security	53.5
Civilians	37.7
Children	6.4
Women	6.1
Other	7.8

<b>Figure 5. Types of small arms seen</b>	
	<b>Percent of respondents</b>
Handguns	91.5
Assault rifles	73.9
Hand grenades	46.3
Landmines	24
Mortars	34.4

<b>Figure 6. Locations where small arms are seen</b>	
	<b>Percent</b>
Personal residences	34.6
Offices	29
Aid delivery areas	18.5
En route aid delivery	27.1
In the field	40.7
Recreational areas	15.7

<b>Figure 7. A question of access: Armed insecurity reduces accessibility to beneficiaries</b>	
	<b>Percent reporting operational obstacle</b>
Little/no violence	15.17
Moderate violence	34.23
High violence	50
Widespread conflict	82.05

<b>Figure 8. Operational obstacles and the prevalence and misuse of small arms</b>	
Suspended/delayed operations-armed conflict * Small arms prevalence & misuse (index) crosstabulation	
	<b>Percent reporting operational obstacle</b>
Very low	10.8
Low	21.4
Moderate	31.2
High	54.2
Very high	69.8

<b>Figure 9. Small arms and civilian death/injury</b>	
	<b>Percent of respondents</b>
Knife/blunt weapon	30.5
Handguns	45.2
Assault rifles	27.1
Hand grenades	18.3
Landmines	23.2
Mortars	3.6

**Figure 10. Under the gun: Comparing casualty rates from handguns and assault rifles**

	Handguns	Assault rifles
Little/no violence	40.7	18.1
Moderate violence	51.1	25.8
High violence	50.6	38.3
Widespread conflict	20.5	35.9

**Figure 11. A cause for concern: Assessing where people feel personally threatened**

Feel of personal threat (5–27) Crosstabulation count

		Perceived security environment				Total
		Little/no violence	Moderate violence	High violence	Widespread conflict	
<b>Feel of personal threat (5–27)</b>	Do not feel threatened at all	95	75	5	9	184
	Feel somewhat threatened	61	130	49	22	262
	Feel very threatened	25	19	26	5	75
<b>Total</b>		181	224	80	36	521
		Little/no violence	Moderate violence	High violence	Widespread conflict	
	1	95	75	5	9	
	2	122	260	98	44	
	3	75	57	78	15	

**Figure 12. Security training**

		Percent	Frequency		
<b>Valid</b>	No	80.06644518	482	No	83.53553
	Yes	15.7807309	95	Yes	16.46447
	Total	95.84717608	577		
<b>Missing</b>	System	4.15282392	25		
<b>Total</b>		100	602		

**Figure 13. Discrepancies in training among respondents**

Have had security training? (5-31a) \* Does citizenship = country working in  
Crosstabulation count

		Does citizenship = country working in		Total
		Expatriate staff	National staff	
<b>Have had security training? (5-31a)</b>	No	73	397	470
	Yes	33	62	95
<b>Total</b>		106	459	565
		Expatriate staff	National staff	
		31.13208	13.50762527	

**Figure 14. Disarming questions: Staff knowledge about small arms**

	Percent of respondents
No items	61.1
One item	19.6
Two items	6.6
Three items	5.6
Four items	2.4
Five items	1.7
All six items	3

**Figure 15. A matter of safety: The effects of security training on risk-avoidance behaviour**

	Percent taking one or more security precautions
No	44
Yes	59

<b>Figure 16. Comparing the security environments of the Balkans and Southeast Asia</b>		
	<b>Balkans</b>	<b>Southeast Asia</b>
Little/no violence	38.2	38.9
Moderate violence	51.8	36.9
High violence	9.9	15.3
Widespread conflict	0	8.9

<b>Figure 17. Comparing small arms types in the Balkans and Southeast Asia</b>		
	<b>Balkans</b>	<b>Southeast Asia</b>
Handguns	90.1	94.7
Assault rifles	58.1	87.3

<b>Figure 18. Stalled operations in the Balkans and Southeast Asia</b>	
	<b>Percent reporting operational obstacle</b>
Balkans	23.2
Southeast Asia	35.6

<b>Figure 19. Staff attitudes toward small arms in the Balkans and Southeast Asia</b>		
	<b>Balkans</b>	<b>Southeast Asia</b>
Expatriate staff	1.57	1.77
National staff	1.42	2.26

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